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SIGNIFICANT TRENDS IN MODERN INCORPORATION
STATUTES
WILEY B. RUTLEDGE, JR.t
The quadrennium of 1887 to 1890 was a red-letter period in
the history of governmental regulation of American corporate
business. During those four years the American system of govern-
ment, viewed as an entirety, fairly may be said to have mounted
the horse of regulation of corporate enterprise and ridden off in
all directions. More accurately stated, the Federal Government
mounted one horse and galloped away in one direction, while
the state governments climbed upon the back of another and
headed him toward exactly the opposite point of the compass.
Executive approval of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act' on July 2,
1890, brought to a legislative culmination two decades of popu-
lar discussion of trusts and monopolies. While the Act was not
limited by its terms to corporations, there is little room for doubt
that the basic motivation for its passage was fear of the growth
of corporate combinations to gigantic size. Thirty years later
the Supreme Court of the United States declared that the statute
did not inhibit "mere size. ' 2 However one may regard this in-
terpretation in the light of the industrial, international and con-
stitutional environment of 1920, he would be naive or hardy in
blindness to the facts and prevailing opinions of national life in
the 80's and 90's who would deny the purpose and design of the
act to keep business units small. That generation sensed the
danger to the prevailing competitive system in permitting the
growth and multiplication of corporate dinosaurs.
t Dean, College of Law, State University of Iowa.
1. 26 Stat. 209, c. 647, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7, 15 (1890).
2. United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417, 40
S. Ct. 293, 64 L. ed. 343 (1920).
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Wholly apart from this policy, which is reflected in the lan-
guage of the Act more by implication than by direct assertion,
the statute is significant for an altogether different reason,
though one highly pertinent to the underlying policy. It consti-
tuted the first major effort of the Federal Government in the
direct regulation of the general system of corporate business.3
A prior'step in this direction, but one much more limited in its
scope and power, had been taken in 1887, when Congress estab-
lished the Interstate Commerce Commission 4. But the Commis-
sion was not to achieve full stature until two decades later. In
any event, the combined effect of the two statutes was to start
the Federal Government off on a long and constantly extending
journey in the limitation and regulation of corporate enterprise.
This, of course, has reached its latest stopping-point in the New
Deal's corporate legislation. Whatever variations from original
objectives may have occurred, the net result of this half-century's
legislation has been to commit the Federal Government to a prac-
tice and a policy of extensive corporate regulation.
Prior to 1890 direct regulation of general corporate business
had been left to the states. This function they had exercised pri-
marily through controls provided as integral portions of their
general incorporation laws.6 On the whole, and with only one or
two notable exceptions, the states had performed the function of
control to the extent of their ability. Practically every general
incorporation law in force prior to 1890 contained rigid limita-
tions upon the scope and freedom of corporate activity. These
reflected a general and all-pervading attitude of suspicion, if not
of fear, toward the corporate institution. "Freedom of incorpo-
ration" then meant only freedom to incorporate on rigidly re-
3. The emphasis is upon the word direct. It is recognized, of course, that
from the very outset the national government has exercised a profound in-
fluence upon business activity through tariff and other legislation. But the
direct regulation of corporate activity was considered primarily a state
function prior to this period.
4. 24 Stat. 379, 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1886).
5. With the passage of the Hepburn Act, June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584,
c. 3591.
6. By this statement it is not intended to minimize the regulatory effect
of the so-called "granger" legislation. The purpose is rather to call atten-
tion to the much wider scope of application of the regulatory provisions of
the general incorporation laws. These extended to the entire incorporated
community of the state, not merely to particular and special industries and
businesses.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/4
INCORPORATION STATUTES
strictive provisions, not, as it has come to mean lately, freedom
from restrictions in incorporation. One may accept Professor
Dodd's summary of the philosophy of the Massachusetts general
incorporation statutes in force in 1886 as fairly typical. He says:
"This statute plainly envisages the business corporation
as an enterprise of definite scope, capable of obtaining new
capital but not, as against the opposition of a single share-
holder, of changing its general character, simple in its capi-
tal structure, democratically controlled, in theory at least,
and reasonably assured of beginning business with funds
adequate to enable it to meet its obligations.!"
He rightly concludes that the corporation was conceived of
largely as "a static enterprise" under this statute and others in
force at that time. The general incorporation laws of the nine-
teenth century were designed primarily to extend the privilege
of limited liability to what may be termed "incorporated part-
nerships" and relatively local "joint-stock companies" rather
than for the creation of institutions national in the spread of
their securities and activities.
But in 1888 the Legislature of New Jersey adopted a little
noted amendment to its general incorporation statutes. This was
destined eventually not only to reverse the historic policy of the
states toward corporations, but to place state policy in dealing
with them fundamentally in opposition to that of the Federal
Government. The provision referred to is the statute which con-
ferred power upon New Jersey corporations to purchase and hold
stock in other corporations., Limitations of space do not permit
us to trace the full or even the major effects of this apparently
minor amendment of the laws of one small state. Suffice it to
say, however, that, whatever its original purpose, this seemingly
simple extension of corporate power has become the foundation
upon which subsequent generations of financiers and lawyers
have erected the present holding company structure of industry
and finance.5 Probably no one completely visualized this possibil-
7. Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-
1936 (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 27 at 33.
8. New Jersey Laws of 1888, ch. 269, § 1, p. 385, and ch. 295, § 1, p.
445. Later extensions appeared in New Jersey Laws of 1889, ch. 265, § 4,
p. 414; New Jersey Laws of 1893, ch. 171, § 1, p. 301.
9. The provision, or one similar, was adopted generally in the other
states, and appears in all the recent general incorporation laws. See text
19371
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ity in 1888. Certainly few recognized in 1890 that New Jersey had
forged a tool with which business could weaken, if not destroy,
the original fundamental policy of the Sherman Act. The brief
period from 1888 to 1890, therefore, presents one of the strang-
est and most profound paradoxes in American legal and indus-
trial history. Just at the time when the Federal Government
was coming to the aid of the states' historic policy toward cor-
portions and was adopting strong measures to make that policy
effective, the states themselves began to turn in the opposite
direction and to throw their ancient policy aside.
Of course such an about-face did not occur instantaneously.
New Jersey merely pointed the way. Other states followed her
example, spacing their action over several decades.
Nor was the influence of this example limited merely to wide-
spread adoption of this particular provision. It became rather
the entering wedge, first for other alterations and amendments
of the old incorporation laws, later for wholesale revamping of
such laws.10 Professor Dodd has traced this process in the two
states of Massachusetts and Illinois." Contrasting what we may
term the "horse-and-buggy" statute of Massachusetts in 1886
with the "thoroughly-up-to-date model" of 1936, he is struck
"by the abandonment of any attempt to limit the size of corpora-
tions, by the willingness to allow incorporators a very large
measure of freedom to determine the character and internal gov-
ernment of their organization, by the relaxation of earlier re-
at infra, notes 63-68. The specific sections of the statutes are: Civil Code
of Calif. § 341, as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 44 (11); Idaho Code 1932,
§ 29-114; Ill. Bus. Corp. Act, § 5; Ind. Gen. Corp. Act, § 3(7); Laws of
La. 1928, Act No. 250, § 12(e) and (j); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, No. 327,
§ 10(i) as amended by P. A. 1935, No. 194; Laws of Minn. 1933, c. 300,
§ 9; Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-8; Pa. P. L. 1933, No. 106, § 302(6); Rem.
Rev. Stat. Wash. 1932, § 3803-12.
The statutes in Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Washington include specific authority to guarantee the
securities of other corporations, though in Louisiana, Minnesota, Pennsyl-
vania and Washington this power is available only when necessary or inci-
dental "to accomplish its purpose or purposes as stated in its articles of
incorporation." A like general limitation appears upon the power to pur-
chase in Pennsylvania and Washington. In California and Ohio specific
authority to subscribe for stock in other corporations is given.
10. Reference may be made particularly to the veritable deluge of no-par
stock legislation in the decade from 1915 to 1925. The climax of the move-
ment has come, of course, in the widespread adoption of new general, and
on the whole "liberal," incorporation laws since 1925.
11. Op. cit. supra, note 7.
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strictions on the consideration for which stock may lawfully be
issued, by the abandonment of any attempt to discourage the
incurring of an indebtedness exceeding the amount of capital,
and by the insertion of a number of provisions designed to facili-
tate corporate growth and change."- Reviewing a similar evo-
lution in Illinois12 he concludes that the draftsmen of the acts
presently in force have "for the most part sought to conform the
provisions of the corporation law to the business practices of
the present day rather than attempt to bring about any substan-
tial change in those practices.112" In other words, to bring his
conclusions within the purview of our paradox, during the half-
century in which the Federal Government has been extending its
control over corporate enterprise, the states have been engaged
simultaneously in abrogating their control.
Although Maine and New Jersey were the original leaders of
this movement, they subsequently back-tracked, 3 and Delaware
assumed the position of leadership. The climax of the movement
has come in the comparatively recent adoption of so-called "mod-
ern" or "liberal" incorporation laws in such old-time "conser-
vative" states as California, Illinois, Indiana, Idaho, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington.14
Undoubtedly these states constitute merely the vanguard of a
procession which will grow longer and longer until perhaps the
entire country will be included. At any rate this area of leg-
islation is an active one, and if the history of state corporate
11a. Id., p. 38.
12. Il. Rev. Stats. (1887), chap. 32; Gen. Corp. Act, Ill. Laws, 1919, p.
312; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935), chap. 32, originally Ill. Laws, 1933, p. 308.
12a. Op. cit. supra, note 7, p. 43.
13. New Jersey's conversion came largely in the progressive administra-
tion of Governor Woodrow Wilson. New Jersey Laws 1913, cc. 13-19, fol-
lowed in 1915 by the adoption of Delaware's new General Corporation Law,
Del. Rev. Code (1915) c. 65. See Dodd, op. cit. supra, note 7, p. 43, n. 67.
14. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, Div. 1, Pt. 4, Tit. I, ch. I-XVI,
§§ 277-413 (enacted in 1931); Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 32, §§ 157.1-
157.167 (enacted in 1933); Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, Tit. 25, ch. 1, 2, §§ 25-101
to 25-254 (enacted in 1929); Idaho Code 1932, Tit. 29, ch. 1, §§ 29-101 to
29-164 (enacted in 1929); La. Gen. Stat. 1932, Tit. XIV, ch. I, §§ 1080-1154
(enacted in 1929); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327; 1935, no. 13,194 (the
original act enacted in 1931); Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300; as am. by
Laws 1935, ch. 117, 212, 230, (enacted in 1933); Throckmorton's Code
(Ohio) 1930, Tit. IX, Div. 1, ch. 1, §§ 8623-1 to 8623-167 (enacted in 1929) ;
Laws of Pa. 1933, no. 106, as am. L. 1935, no. 361 (enacted in 1933) ; Rem-
ington's Rev. Stat. (Wash.) 1932, Tit. 25, ch. 1, §§ 3803-3852, as am. by
Rem. 1933 and 1936 pocket supp. (enacted in 1933).
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legislation during the past half-century is not to be reversed,
numerous accessions to this group may be expected in the near
future.15 The wide geographic distribution of the states which
have acted to date indicates that the problem and the trend are
not local or sectional in character. While the new acts vary
greatly in specific detail, they have many common elements of
change. The trend is almost universally in the directions indi-
cated by Professor Dodd.16 It becomes a matter of really national
importance, therefore, to ascertain the significance of these stat-
utes, in so far as the complexity and variety of detail permit.17
Perhaps the most outstanding common tendencies of the new
statutes involve: the elimination of visitatorial powers and ad-
ministrative supervision in the incorporative process coupled
with the introduction of a very large amount of freedom of con-
tract in drafting the articles of incorporation; the general aboli-
tion of the old restrictive provisions in regard to capitalization
and the authorization of new types and almost universally un-
limited amounts of security issues; the broad scope of the powers
of amendment of the articles with consequent restriction, if not
elimination, of the fixed contractual and "vested" rights of the
shareholder; the delegation of vastly greater power to the corpo-
ration in carrying on its business, together with practically com-
plete abandonment of the notions of limited enterprise and ultra
15. The general trend of recent legislation may be expected to continue.
The history of recent state legislation, especially as reflected in the no-par
stock laws and those conferring power to purchase securities whether of
the corporation's own issue or another's, seems to indicate that once such a
movement is under way its progress becomes irresistible. Two rather im-
probable contingencies might check or stop the process, namely the enact-
ment by Congress of a Federal incorporation law of broad and compulsory
application coupled with decisions by the Supreme Court sustaining the
law in its major applications. It is doubtful, however, whether even these
events could stop the march of the states in their own legislation. On the
other hand, these events, should they occur, undoubtedly would render the
effects of the new state laws much more innocuous than they are at present.
16. Supra, notes 7 and 11a.
17. The author recognizes the validity of Professor Dodd's assertion that
"the statutory side of corporation law is far too complex to make any com-
prehensive treatment of it in a single article at all practicable." Op. cit.
supra, note 7, p. 27. But while comprehensive treatment within such limi-
tations is impossible, it is believed that sufficient similarity of general
tendency may be found among the almost infinite variety of detail to justify
the present effort. For obvious reasons, both of space and time, it has been
impossible to make exhaustive the citations for particular statements, even
among the ten statutes herein considered. The attempt has been to go only
so far as is necessary to show a tendency.
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vires action; a correlative increase in the powers of the directors;
and the final disappearance of nearly all forms of shareholder's
statutory liability except for the payment of the subscription
price for shares. Before considering in detail the specific statu-
tory provisions which embody and reflect these tendencies, one
or two preliminary comments of a general nature may be made.
Professor Dodd attributes the general tendency of the new
statutes to accept the business practices of the present rather
than attempt to change them primarily to a desire to "check the
tendency to incorporate in other states, particularly in Dela-
ware."' Undoubtedly the factor of state competition for cor-
porate fees has been highly influential in bringing about gen-
eral acceptance of the so-called "liberalizing" trend in the new
enactments. On the other hand, it may be doubted whether this
has been the major influence rather than the reason assigned for
it, in view of the states' unquestioned and formerly almost abso-
lute power to exclude foreign corporations from their intra-state
business. 19 If the basic desire underlying the enactment of the
recent statutes were merely to keep local business at home for
purposes of incorporation, the plain, simple and indicated rem-
edy would be the enactment of much more rigid regulations con-.
cerning the entrance of foreign corporations.20 The fact is, how-
ever, that this method has been rejected. In view of this, it is
probable that there are much more deeply rooted causes for the
general acceptance of the Delaware principle. Among these may
be mentioned, perhaps, the growing practice of minority legisla-
tion in response to pressure from powerful groups, in this in-
18. Op. cit. supra, note 7, pp. 42 and 43.
19. The qualifying adverb "formerly" would be unnecessary but for the
possibilities for extension of the two recent decisions of Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 80 L. ed. 299 (1936), and Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57, 73 L. ed. 204 (1928). While
it is too early to contend that the combined effect of these cases has been
to overrule the historic policy of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 586,
10 L. ed. 274 (1839) and Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (1869),
the tendency of these cases hardly can be considered as consistent with the
relatively unrestricted scope of that policy.
20. While there has been a very considerable amount of statutory regula-
tion of foreign corporations, this on the whole has taken the form of pro-
visions for service of process and to secure the compliance by foreign cor-
porations with requirements concerning filing their papers and making
certain reports, rather than with any hearty attempt to exclude them from
the state.
1937]
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stance the local big business community ;21 the development and
general acceptance in an increasingly corporately organized
world, of the notion that incorporation is a kind of modern "nat-
ural right"22 rather than a special privilege; and finally, and
perhaps most important of all these considerations, the fact that
the old types of corporation statute, the 1886 models, though in
general suited to their day, have become antiquated and inade-
quate to the needs of modern high-powered business organized
,on a mass-production scale.
Whatever the cause or causes of the development, the ten-
•dencies of the new statutes all look toward an increase of power
and mobility in the corporation and a correlative decrease of
fixed right in the shareholder; a reversal of Maine's trend from
status to contract. The corporation and its management have
acquired greatly increased motive power and adjustability, but
the individual stockholder has been placed almost in the position
of holding a "pig-in-a-poke". It is paradoxical that this change
has been brought about by an expanded use of the contract
-device.
That these changes have occurred does not involve the conclu-
sion necessarily that they are unnecessary or undesirable. It is
conceivable that they have been essential concomitants of the
general stage of social evolution and organization through which
we are passing. It may be that a society organized as broadly
as ours is upon the basis of machines and under the capitalistic
system, changing as rapidly as it has done during the last fifty
years, can operate only with highly mobile industrial and finan-
,cial organizations. If this is true, and the tendency certainly
seems to have been in this direction, the predilection of Mr.
.Justice Brandeis and others to the contrary notwithstanding, the
power phases of the recent corporate development have been nec-
essary phases of that growth. One could not expect to get satis-
factory results on modern highways with a motor car of the
21. It may be said fairly that in every instance the new statutes are
"big business" statutes. If their purpose were merely to serve the needs of
small, local concerns, it would be hardly necessary to include the vast
powers and intricate provisions concerning capitalization and distributions
which characterize all of them and are most appropriate for the very large
,organization.
22. Cf. Brandeis, J., dissenting in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53
.S. Ct. 481, 77 L. ed. 929 (1933).
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model of 1893. Nor could one expect to build a 1937 model motor
car with an engine following the design of 1893. The failure, if
any, has been in the provision of adequate brakes for the ma-
chine. To carry the motor metaphor further, one would not care
to drive a 1937 Packard equipped only with the brakes of a
covered wagon. Vast horse power requires correlative braking
power. It is possible that the failure of the so-called modern
incorporation laws, if any, is in their attempt to provide this
power to stop. This requires, of course, the substitution of con-
trols as radically different from the old ones as in the power
of the new institution from that of the old.
In order to consider the problem more specifically, let us ex-
amine in broad outline what the new acts do.
I.
Before discussing the expansion of power and the creation of
new controls, we may consider a few preliminary matters, in-
volving principally the organization of the company.
Under the older statutes there were two general types of pro-
cedure for incorporation. One was practically automatic; the
other involved a considerable amount of administrative super-
vision by public officials. In the latter group it was common to
require an examination by the Secretary of State, and frequently
also by the Attorney General, to determine the legality of the
articles as drawn, and in some instances to exercise even broader
discretion. Perhaps the most extreme statute of this character
is that still existing in Iowa,2 3 providing in substance that when
the articles are presented to the Secretary of State for filing he
is to satisfy himself "that they are in proper form to meet the
requirements of law, that their object is a lawful one and not
against public policy, and that their plan for doing business, if
any be provided for, is honest and lawful.124 In case of doubt as
to the legality of the articles, he is required to submit them to
the Attorney General, whose duty it is to examine and return
them with an opinion upon the points inquired about. Provision
is made, in case of rejection, for an appeal to the Executive
Council of the state, which is authorized to determine again
whether the articles are "in proper form, of honest purpose, not
23. Code of Iowa 1935, chap. 384, §§ 8344-47.
24. Id., § 8344.
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against public policy, nor otherwise objectionable."12r This stat-
ute has- been interpreted to permit a very great amount of ad-
ministrative supervision of incorporation.2 But it represents a
position which is directly the opposite of the trend of the more
modern laws. Nearly all of these follow the automatic procedure.
Provision for prescription of forms and approval of the articles
by the Secretary of State is made in Illinois, Indiana and in
Idaho, 27 but the amount of discretion which he is permitted to
assume is relatively small. In Illinois and Indiana, provision is
made for judicial review of the Secretary's refusal to issue a
certificate. 28 However it is doubtful whether these provisions
accomplish much more than would be achieved without them,
except by way of simplifying procedure. In an age of rapid
growth and development in administrative law, the states appar-
ently have concluded that administrative supervision is unneces-
sary and undesirable in the formation of private corporations.
One reason for this may be that the old forms of supervision
proved to be relatively ineffective, principally because the whole
matter was dumped into the laps of public officials overburdened
with other and more immediately pressing duties. Even in Michi-
gan, where the state has established a corporation commission
which performs the functions usually carried out by the Secre-
tary of State in respect to incorporation,29 there is no general
delegation of power comparable to that in Iowa for supervising
the process of incorporation.
Nearly all of the new laws permit incorporation by three or
more natural persons, and most of them have dropped the old
requirements of residence and citizenship. 2 1 An interesting vari-
ation appears in the Michigan act, which provides that: "one or
more persons, natural or corporate, may incorporate under this
act," 0 a provision which goes further than that of any other
state. It has, however, at least the merit of honest recognition
25. Id., § 8347.
26. See Lloyd v. Ramsey, 192 Ia. 103, 183 N. W. 333 (1921).
27. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1933, ch. 32, § 157.48; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933,
§ 25-217; Ida. Code of 1932, § 29-108(1). See also Dart's (La.) Stat. 1932,
§ 1084; Page's Gen. Code (Ohio) § 8623-6.
28. Laws of III. 1933, B. C. A., § 148; Ind. Gen. Corp. Act, § 1, sec. 72.
29. Mich. Pub. Acts 1935, no. 13.
29a. In some states the new acts still require a specified proportion of
the incorporators, usually two-thirds, to be citizens of the United States.
30. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 3.
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of the facts which underlie and are evidenced by the practice of
using "dummy" incorporators. While Iowa permits incorpora-
tion by a single individual,31 it has not extended the privilege
specifically to other corporations. Somewhat incongruously, the
Michigan statute requires at least three directors, 32 apparently
even in the case of incorporation by a single individual.
Except for drafting the articles, the procedure is relatively
simple, involving execution and acknowledgement of articles by
the incorporators, filing them with a public official, and usually
also with the recorder of the county where the principal or reg-
istered office is located. Many of the statutes require the issu-
ance of a certificate of incorporation by the Secretary of State
or other public official, 33 but this is not universal . 4 All of the
statutes, except Minnesota and Pennsylvania, seem to have dis-
pensed with the old rigmarole of publication as a part of the
incorporative process. 5
The new statutes very generally specify a particular point in
the procedure at which the corporate existence is stated to begin.
In Michigan and California, this is upon filing of the articles in
the central public office ;83 in Louisiana upon filing in the office of
the parish recorder;37 in Idaho, Illinois and Indiana, on issuance
of the certificate of incorporation after filing of the articles. 8
Undoubtedly these provisions are helpful in eliminating the old
problems which arose with reference to alleged failure to comply
with the conditions precedent to incorporation. The statutes usu-
ally provide also that the certificate of incorporation shall be
conclusive evidence of incorporation, generally reserving the
state's right to challenge the validity of the organization." Pro-
31. Code of Iowa, 1935, chap. 384, § 8340. The provision extends back
to the Code of 1851, sec. 702.
32. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 13.
33. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-108; Ind. Gen. Corp. Act, § 18; Laws of Ill.
1933, Bus. Corp. A., § 49; Laws of La. 1928, no. 250, § 5; Laws of Minn.
1933, c. 300, § 5; Pa. Bus. Corp. L. § 206(A) (P. L. 1933, no. 106).
34. There is no provision for such a certificate in Michigan and Ohio.
35. See the Minnesota and Pennsylvania provisions, Laws of Minn. 1933,
ch. 300, § 5 (III); Pa. B. C. L.. § 205 (P. L. 1933, no. 106).
36. Mich Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 5(2); Deering's Civil Code of Calif.
1931, § 292.
37. La. Gen. Stats. 1932, § 1084(I).
38. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-108(2); Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (Ill.) 1935,
ch. 32, § 157.49; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-218.
39. See, for example, Idaho Code 1932, § 29-112; Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat.(Il1.) 1935, ch. 32, § 157.49; Burns' nd. Stat. 1933, § 25-218.
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fessor Ballantine has pointed out, however, that the effect of
these provisions in Illinois has been muddled by the retention
of the "rather blind and inadequate provision" of the former law
as to the assumption of corporate powers by persons unauthor-
ized to do so.40 In Minnesota, the section establishing the certi-
ficate as conclusive evidence of incorporation, somewhat incon-
sistently goes on to provide, "nothing in this section shall limit
the existing rules of law as to corporations de facto nor as to
corporations by estoppel." 41
Nearly all of the new acts set up special conditions precedent
to engaging in business operations as distinguished from the
inception of corporate existence. Where the statutes require the
articles to specify a minimum paid in capital, payment of this
and some form of proof thereof constitute such conditions. Pro-
visions of this sort are found in Louisiana, Minnesota, and In-
diana.42 In several of the states the condition of filing a dupli-
cate or triplicate of the articles in the office of the county recorder
is specified.43 These provisions usually are given sanction by the
imposition of a joint and several liability upon the directors not
dissenting, for engaging in transactions or incurring debts, "ex-
cept such as are incidental to organization or to obtaining sub-
scriptions, or to payment for shares." 44
The trend seems clearly indicated also to constitute the com-
pletion of incorporation by an acceptance of pre-incorporation
subscriptions without further action by way of "adoption" by the
corporation. This is true, for instance, in Michigan, Idaho, and
Louisiana.4 5 Rather unusual provisions appear in Idaho and
Minnesota. In the former, the subscription is made irrevocable
for one year;46 in the latter it is irrevocable unless otherwise pro,
40. Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Corporation Act (1934)
1 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 357, 380, n. 68. The provision in question is sec.
149, Ill. Gen. Corp. Act 1919, retained in Bus. Corp. Act, Cahill's Rev.
Stats. 1933, c. 32, § 150.
41. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 7.
42. Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-219; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 12;
La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1089.
43. Civil Code of Calif. § 292, as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 4, and
§ 293 as amended by L. 1933, § 5 (the latter relating only to real estate);
Ida. Code 1932, § 29-108; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 5 (1).
44. See Idaho Code 1932, § 29-110(2); Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-
219 (c).
45. Mich. Pub. Acts, 1931, no. 327, § 8; Idaho Code 1932, § 29-109(3);
La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1086.
46. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-109(1) (a); likewise in Louisiana: La. Gen.
Stat. 1932, § 1086 (I) (a).
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vided in writing until sixty days after issuance of the certificate,
but void unless accepted within that time.47 Many of the statutes
save the right to avoid the subscription on grounds which would
be sufficient for the rescission of contract.48 There are frequent
provisions also with reference to collection of unpaid subscrip-
tion price, including the creation of liens on shares for the un-
paid balance of the price,'4 9 and in some instances rather harsh
provisions for forfeiture of previous payments in case of de-
fault.0
While these provisions undoubtedly will create some new prob-
lems of interpretation, on the whole their effect will be to clear
away causes of litigation and to reduce the volume of court action
arising out of irregular or defective incorporation.
II.
In a discussion which must be limited by considerations of
space as this must be, any attempt at specific and detailed treat-
ment of the scope of the expansion of corporate and managerial
powers must fail. It will be possible only to refer briefly to cer-
tain phases of the expansion which are outstanding. First, with
reference to the scope of corporate powers.
All of the new statutes seem to abandon the old attempt at
enumeration of specific types of businesses open to incorporation.
Even the later phrase "for any lawful business," while retained
in some of the statutes, has been replaced in others by such
phrases as "any lawful purpose,"5' 1 "for any purpose or purposes,
other than carrying on the practice of any profession, for which
natural persons lawfully may associate,"' 2 "for any lawful busi-
ness purpose."' 3 All specify certain exceptions such as banking,
47. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 16, (II), (a).
48. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-109 (2); La. Gen. Stat. 1932 § 1086 (II); Laws
of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 16 (III).
49. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-127; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-205(d); La.
Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1086 (IV); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 28; Laws of
Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 16 (VII).
50. See, for example, La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1086 (IV); Mich. Pub. Acts
1931, n. 327, § 28. The provision of the latter act, especially, for forfeiture
not only of the stock but also of all amounts previously paid "as liquidated
damages" without reference to any relation between this amount and the
damage actually sustained, seems almost vindictive. Contrast with this the
much more reasonable provision in Indiana: Gen. Corp. Act. § 6(d).
51. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (Ill.) 1935, ch. 32, § 157.3.
52. Page's Ohio Gen. Stat. Supp. (1926-1935), § 8623-3.
53. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-102; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-201; Laws of
Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 2.
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insurance, and railroad or other specifically named public utility
corporations. Perhaps one significant effect of these new types
of statement will be to authorize incorporation for a single ven-
ture or transaction rather than for a continuous series of trans-
actions sufficient to make up a "business" in the commonly ac-
cepted sense of the term.5 4  ,
All of the statutes require that the articles shall state the pur-
poses and objects of the corporation, thus retaining the language
of the old notion of the corporation as a limited enterprise.
However, so far as the scope of the limitation is concerned, it
is greatly restricted by at least two types of provision. One,
which appears in many of the statutes, is as follows: "The filing
or recording of the articles of incorporation, or amendments
thereto, or of any other papers pursuant to the provisions of
this act, is required for the purpose of affording all persons the
opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the contents thereof, but
no person dealing with the corporation shall be charged with
constructive notice of the contents of any such articles or papers
by reason of such filing or recordation." An interesting varia-
tion appears in Michigan, where is it provided that no person
dealing with the corporation shall be charged with or be entitled
to assert constructive notice of the contents of the articles, except
54. Perhaps also the language is broad enough to permit its meaning to
be stretched to the other extreme, illustrated in the certificate of incorpora-
tion of the Goldman-Sachs Trading Corporation, containing this clause:
"In general, to carry on any business not contrary to, the laws of Dela-
ware. . .". See Magill and Hamilton, Cases on Business Organization, II
(1933) 730. It may be questioned whether the language "anv ]awful busi-
ness" or "purpose" is intended to mean "any and all." The Ohio provision,
literally interpreted, seems broad enough to sustain the Goldman-Sachs pro-
vision. If the other forms of language are to be given equally broad effect,
the new acts have moved a great distance from the old law which held
specification of corporate objects to be a mandatory requirement of incor-
poration, and asserted as the basis of ultra vires decisions (1) an interest
of each shareholder in having the corporation kept within the limits of the
risks assumed by him and (2) an interest in the state and the public in
seeing that it does not usurp functions not granted to it. While it still would
be possible theoretically for the shareholders (actually the promoter-incor-
porators) to limit their risks to specified enterprises or businesses by con-
tractual provision in the articles, the well known tendency of promoters to
assume all the powers authorized would render this possibility of little prac-
tical value. This provision is only one of several which have the combined
effect of reducing the formerly prevailing requirement of a limited enter-
prise to a merely verbal shadow of itself. See text at notes 55 and 57; also
notes 79-89.
55. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-113; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1091; Laws of
Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 10; Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-9.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/4
INCORPORATION STATUTES
shareholders, officers and directors of the corporation, and with
one other exception 56
The profession rightly may welcome extinction of the doctrine
of constructive notice of the articles' contents in application to
ordinary, every-day business transactions with outsiders, and
perhaps in relation to such transactions with shareholders, as
well as some others of an "internal" nature. But at the same time
one well may wonder whether this provision will be applied by
the courts when the articles contain specific requirements for
or prohibitions of action in regard to large matters of unusual
or "fundamental" importance, and the question presented is as
to such matters. On the whole, the exception as to officers and
directors and less certainly that as to shareholders contained in
some of the acts seems a desirable limitation. In the writer's
view, officers and directors should be expected to know some-
thing about their articles and ordinarily should not be permitted
to hide behind a shield of ignorance regarding their contents.
Correlative with the provision concerning notice, and undoubt-
edly intended to operate in the same direction, is the more spe-
cific attempt to abrogate or limit the operation of the doctrine
of ultra vires action. The general provision is that the corpora-
tion "shall have the capacity to act possessed by natural persons
but authority only as necessary or proper to accomplish purposes
as expressed or implied in the articles. 1 7 Professor Ballantine,
and others, have pointed out that this attempt has been only
partially successful, due primarily to the failure of the statutes
to go further and point out more specifically what the conse-
quences of unauthorized action shall be.5 The provision of the
56. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 9.
57. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-114; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-202; La. Gen.
Stat. 1932, § 1092; Ohio G. C. § 8623-8; Pa. B. C. L., § 301 (P. L. 1933,
no. 106); Rem. Rev. Stat. Wash. 1932, § 3803-11.
58. Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation
Act (1934) 1 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 357, 381-3. Particular criticism is
directed against paragraph (a) of Section 8 of the Illinois Act, and a
similar provision in Section 303 (1) of the 1933 Pennsylvania Business Cor-
poration Law. The paragraph permits a shareholder to enjoin the corpora-
tion from doing unauthorized acts including performance of executory and
partially executed contracts, if the court deems such action "to be equi-
table." Provision is made, however, for allowing damages (not including
anticipated profits) to the corporation or other parties resulting from the
court's action in setting aside and enjoining the performance of the con-
tract. See also Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Cor-
poration Law (1931) 19 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 473-5.
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California law, presumably drafted by him, specifically does this,
abrogating the defense as between the corporation and any
shareholder or third person, both as to domestic and foreign cor-
porationsA9 However, it permits a shareholder or the state to
enjoin unauthorized business where third parties have not ac-
quired rights thereby, and suits against officers or directors by
the corporation or shareholders in a representative suit for vio-
lation of their authority. In Illinois the effect of the general
provision is limited by specific authorization of an injunction
against continued performance of partly executed contracts,
with a provision for indemnity to outsiders, or the corporation,
if damaged by the injunction. 0 In Michigan the plea is denied
to all except to the corporation in an action between it and a
director, officer, or person having actual knowledge of the ultra
vires nature of the act, and except to either party in an action
between the shareholders and the corporation.61 In Indiana
there is an unusual provision permitting ultra vires acts to be
voided in a suit by the prosecuting attorney. 2 While most of
these provisions are undoubtedly ambiguous and therefore defec-
tive, the tendency to the elimination of ultra vires problems has
been a healthy one, but it involves necessarily a considerable
expansion of corporate power. On the whole, this extension is
not objectionable, especially-in view of the breadth of corporate
objectives which may be assumed, and of the powers of amend-
ment conferred by recent statutes.
The new acts invariably follow the lead of New Jersey and
Delaware in granting practically unrestricted authority to pur-
chase and in most instances to guarantee the securities of other
corporations, domestic and foreign. A common provision reads
as follows: ".... to acquire, guarantee, hold, own and vote, and to
59. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 345.
60. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 32, § 157.8; and see note 58, supra.
61. Mich. Pub. Acts 1935, no. 194, § 11; Ohio and Minnesota also make
abrogation of the defense dependent upon whether the person dealing with
the corporation had actual knowledge of the limitations upon the authority
of its representatives: Ohio: Page's Ann. Code (1932 Supp.), § 8623-8;
Minn. Laws of 1933, c. 300, § 11.
62. Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-253. (Gen. Corp. Act 1929, § 54). As
an inducement toward vigilant enforcement, a fee of fifty dollars for the
prosecutor is provided, to be taxed as part of the costs of the proceeding.
This should overcome some of the lethargy which public officials have dis-
played heretofore about such matters.
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sell, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of
the capital stock, bonds, securities, or evidences of indebtedness
of any other corporation, domestic or foreign."63 In Illinois this is
extended to securities of associations, partnerships, or individ-
uals." In Louisiana it includes special provisions as to guaran-
teeing principal, interest and dividends of, or on securities of,
other corporations.65 In Minnesota it is necessary for the articles
to authorize the purchase or other form of acquisition, but
strangely without such authority the corporation may guarantee
the securities of other companies, though only "when reasonably
necessary or incidental to accomplish the purposes stated in its
articles."' 6 This widespread adoption of the foundation stone of
the holding company structure, without limitation or restriction,
is at least very questionable. If it is deemed necessary to au-
thorize all types of manufacturing corporations, from the Cor-
ner Peanut Wagon, Incorporated, to the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, to have liquid outlet for their surpluses,
it would seem that the authority could be conferred with some
reasonable restrictions and limitations. It should not be beyond
the capacity of legislators or expert advisers and draftsmen to
devise limitations which would have at least the tendency to
prevent the speculative abuses which such broad authority makes
possible. Even less defensible seems the provision for guarantee-
ing obligations of other corporations. An interesting commen-
tary upon this clause is found in the provision of the Michigan
statute which requires: ".... that any corporation organized or
doing business in this state under this act shall not have the
power to guarantee or in any wise become surety upon any bond
or other undertaking securing the deposit of public moneys.16T
The Michigan statute is one of the few which attempt to put
any limitations upon the general power, but these are not signif-
icant on the whole as restrictions of speculative activity on the
part of the company. And if we are to have holding companies,
63. Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-202(7); La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1092;
Mich. Pub. Acts 1933, no. 194, § 10(1) ; and see the statutes cited post, n.
64-67. See also supra, note 9, and the particular statutes cited, for varia-
tions in language and scope of the provisions.
64. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 32, § 157.5.
65. La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1092(e), (j).
66. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 9.
67. Mich. Pub. Acts 1935, no. 194, § 10 (i).
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iertainly some further legislation for controlling their possi-
bilities for abuse could be devised. 6
All of the states have adopted the general principle of per-
mitting the corporation to deal in its own shares, whether by
way of purchase or redemption. This, however, is generally
hedged about by some general limitations, ranging from the old
vague provision that the purchase is permissible provided it does
not result in an impairment of capital,"" to the relatively detailed
and specific provisions of such statutes as that in California.,'
This whole subject, of course, is tied up with the general prob-
lem of capital distributions, which will be treated at a later
point.7 1 Probably it is impossible to stem the flow of a legal, as
it is that of the natural, Niagara. But the writer is one of at
least a considerable minority who agree with Professor Nuss-
baum and others that this tendency has been carried further in
the United States than there is any real need for carrying it,
and-that a more healthy attitude would be the acceptance of the
English and continental view makin'g provision, in accordance
with that view, for authority to purchase in specifically excepted
cases.
72
Other broad powers have been conferred with reference to
borrowing money and giving security for the obligation so in-
curred, the later statutes having removed practically all restric-
68. The California Act appears to be the only one which gives appreci-
able attention to the holding company problem. It does undertake a defini-
tion of holding and subsidiary corporations, Cal. Civ. Code (1931) § 278,
and makes specific requirements concerning information as to th6 relations
between them, particularly in financial matters. Civil Code, § 358, as
amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 57. There is also a provision limiting to
specified purposes the purchase by the subsidiary of the holding company's
stock. Civil Code § 342, as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 45. See also the
provision, which appears in some other states, regulating loans to, and
guaranties of the obligations of, directors, officers, and in some instances
shareholders by the corporation and its subsidiaries. Calif. Gen. Code, § 366,
as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 67.
69. See Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-202(8); Mich. Pub. Acts 1935, no.
194 § 10(h).
70. Deering's Civil Code 1931, § 342. See also La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1103.
71. See post, p. 333ff.
72. See Nussbaum, Acquisition by a Corporation of its Own Stock (1935)
35 Col. L. Rev. 971; Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern
Corporation Law (1931) 19 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 479; Levy, Purchase by a
Corporation of Its Own Stock (1930) 15 Minn. L. Rev. 1; Morawetz,
Private Corporations (2d ed. 1886) §§ 112, 113. Professor Nussbaum com-
ments: "As far as can be discovered, the American majority rule stands
alone in the world of comparative law." Op. cit. supra, p. 976.
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tions upon the total amount of indebtedness which the corpora-
tion and the directors are permitted to incur. The old require-
ment, that the total amount of outstanding corporate debts and
obligations should have some specific relation to the issued capi-
tal stock, had behind it at least the philosophy that the corporate
shoe-string should not be too short. The modern statutes, how-
ever, not only remove these restrictions but in general take away
the limitations which existed in the old requirement that in cer-
tain instances, at least involving long term loans, the consent
of a majority or some other percentage of the shareholders
should be obtained.
Another significant expansion has appeared in the general
acceptance of provisions authorizing the corporation to sell and
dispose of its entire assets and business in the absence of unani-
mous consent of the shareholders. The usual provision requires
a specified majority of the voting shares, as in California 73 and
Michigan 74 where a mere majority suffices, and in Idaho, Indiana
and Minnesota 75 where a two-thirds majority is required. In
some of the states, as in Minnesota, 6 the additional limitation
appears that when the articles so require, a vote by classes in
addition to the specified majority is necessary. Some of the stat-
utes dispense entirely with the shareholders' vote when the cor-
poration is unable to meet its obligations as they mature, vesting
the power to dispose of the enterprise in the directorsY7
The general effect of these provisions, whatever the variance
in detail, is of course to deprive the individual investor of his
73. Deering's Civil Code, 1931, § 343.
74. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 57.
75. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-44; Burns' Ind. Stats. 1933, § 25-239; Laws of
Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 35.
76. Laws of Minn, 1933, ch. 300, § 35; also Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. Ill.
1935, ch. 32, § 157.72.
77. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-144; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1121. In California
and Ohio it is provided specifically that no vote of the shareholders shall
be necessary to mortgage or pledge all or part of the corporation's prop-
erty, unless otherwise provided in the articles. Calif. Civ. Code, § 344; Ohio
Gen. Code, §8623-73. Pennsylvania retains the old-time conservatism in the
matter of bonded indebtedness. The statute prohibits a corporation to
increase its indebtedness (other than that contracted in the regular course
of business) except upon adoption by the directors of a resolution and
concurrence therein by a majority of the outstanding shares, and also,
when any class or classes are entitled to vote thereon as a class, by a
majority of each such class. Pa. B. C. L. § 309. Rigid provisions for sixty
days' advance notice of the meeting at which the resolution is to be pre-
sented to the shareholders for action are made.
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right to the continuance of the enterprise, even in a going con-
cern. On the whole, as to the large corporation, this seems to
be a beneficial change. It effectually checks the operations of
the shareholder-blackmailer. Assuming also that the voting
power is widely distributed among the shareholders, it accords
with a generally democratic philosophy. On the other hand, it
is, of course, entirely possible that the voting power will be con-
centrated in a very small segment of the outstanding shares. In
this situation possibilities of autocratic termination of the enter-
prise are great unless the general requirement of consent of vot-
ing shares is further checked in some other manner. The effect
of the provision upon the dissenting bona fide shareholder is
somewhat softened by the provision quite generally adopted per-
mitfing him to demand payment for his shares in cash at the
fair cash value fixed by an appraisal or by judicial determina-
tion.78
One of the most important expansions of power has been in
the provisions relating to amendment of articles. The outstand-
ing purpose appears to have been to get around the vested rights
and contract theories of share ownership. One of the common-
est provisions is to authorize amendment "without limitation so
long as the articles as amended would have been authorized by
this act as original articles." This form of language, following
closely the Delaware provision,71 appears in Indiana and Michi-
gan. 0 Another form of statement appears in Minnesota, namely,
"... so as to include or omit any provision which it would have
been lawful to include in or omit from original articles at the
time the amendment is made."8' In Idaho and Louisiana, the lan-
guage is, "so as to include any provision authorized by this act."82
Though the general purpose has been to eliminate the blocking
of an amendment by a single dissenting shareholder or small
group of shareholders, the statutes vary considerably in the pro-
visions with respect to the adoption of the amendment. In In-
diana and Michigan, for instance, it is required that the amend-
78. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-149; Ill. Bus. Corp. Act 1933 (L. 1933, p. 110)§ 73; Ind. Gen. Corp. Act 1929, § 41; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 44;
Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-65; Rem. Rev. Stat. Wash. 1932, § 3803-41.
79. Rev. Code of Dela. 1915, ch. 65, § 1940.
80. Burns' Ind. Stats. 1933, § 25-221; Mich. Pub. Acts 1935, no. 194, § 43.
81. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 36 (I).
82. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-145(1) ; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1122(I).
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ment be proposed by resolution of the board and adopted by a
majority of the shares entitled to vote thereon.8 3 In other states,
and more commonly, approval of two-thirds of the holders of
voting stock is required, as in Idaho (except for change of the
corporate name, which may be adopted by a majority). 84 In
Minnesota, however, the articles are permitted to state any de-
sired majority, 5 and in the absence of such a statement, the
amendment must receive either the vote of two-thirds of the vot-
ing shares or a majority of voting shares coupled with the ab-
sence of a negative vote of more than one-fourth of such shares.88
It is quite generally provided also that when the amendment will
adversely affect the interests and relative position of any class
of shares, that class shall be entitled to vote as a class and a
specified majority of such class, in addition to the majority of
the general vote, is required to concur in the amendment.87 While
these provisions offer a very real check upon the power of amend-
ment, they leave open the possibility, even where the class vote
is provided for, that the amendment may operate to the detri-
ment of one class and to the benefit of another. When a majority
of the shares of the class injured is held by persons who will be
benefited as owners of the class benefited by the amendment,
even these provisions may be inadequate to prevent unjust jug-
gling of the share structure. In Illinois the statute does not leave
open to question the types of amendments upon which a class is
entitled to vote. The statute contains a specific enumeration of
such amendments., While such an enumeration may not be nec-
essary, it at least constitutes a safeguard with reference to the
most important incidents of share ownership which might well
be followed in other jurisdictions.
The general effect of these provisions remains to be deter-
mined. They resemble very closely the so-called "Henry VIIIth
83. Burns' Ind. Stats. 1933, §§ 25-222, 25-223; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no.
327, § 43.
84. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-145; Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. Ill. 1935, ch. 32,
§ 157.53; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1122; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 36.
85. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 36 (III) (b); also La. Gen. Stat. 1932,
§ 1122(11).
86. Laws of Minn. 1935, ch. 117, § 6.
87. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-145(4); Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-224; La.
Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1122(111); Mich. Pub. Acts 1935, no. 194, § 43; Laws of
Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 36.
88. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 32, § 157.54.
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clause" which has become common in recent English legislation
establishing administrative agencies.,, While it is not certain
that the courts will not read some limitations into them, acting
under a vested rights theory, no one as yet knows what these
limitations will be, if any. While a broad power of amendment
seems necessary, it is at least doubtful whether a provision as
broad in its possibilities as this is required. Perhaps there should
be a few fundamental rights of the shareholder not subject to
change by any majority.
Another check is provided in some of the statutes in the form
of a provision for a demand for payment in cash by a dissenting
shareholder of a class, in effect similar to that provided in the
case of sale or disposition of the entire corporate assets.5 '
Another general characteristic of the expansion of corporate
powers is a rather large extension of the directors' powers, or
of authorization for provisions in the articles for such extension.
This may be illustrated by the provisions relating to new security
issues. Thus, in California the articles may authorize the board
"to fix or alter the dividend rate of the redemption or liquidation
price of any class or of any series of any class, or the number of
shares constituting any series of any class, or of all or any of
them, in respect of shares then unissued.""' Such a provision, of
course, vests in the directors of a prospering corporation almost
unlimited power to alter the relative position of issued shares by
issuing new securities. In states-where amendments are required
to be submitted by the directors, they have in substance a veto
power on such changes. 91a
89. See Stamp, Recent Tendencies Towards the Devolution of Legislative
Functions to the Administration (1924) 2 J. of Pub. Ad. 23; quot. Frank-
furter & Davison, Cases on Administrative Law (2d ed. 1935) 219.
90. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-149; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1132; Laws of Minn.
1933, c. 300, § 39 as amended by L. 1935, c. 212, § 1, 2; Rem. Rev. Stat.
Wash. 1932, § 3803-41.
91. Deering's Civil Code 1931, § 290(5). See, also, similar provisions (in
one or two cases limited to "series") in Ill. B. C. A. (L. 1933, p. 310)§ 53(i), (j), (k) and § 15(f); Ind. B. C. A. § 17(6) (b); Laws of Minn.
1933, c. 300, § 3, I(e); Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-4, 4(b); Pa. B. C. L.
§ 204(7) and § 804 (series only). In Illinois the directors have the power
to make by-laws, unless this is reserved by the articles to the shareholders.
B. C. A. § 25. They also have the power to increase the stated capital.
Id. § 19.
91a. Ill. B. C. A. § 53; Ind. B. C. A. § 23; Pa. B. C. L. § 802; and in
Illinois the veto extends to reduction of stated capital. B. C. A. § 59.
This general expansion of directors' powers occurs even though the stat-
utes usually provide that the directors need not be shareholders, unless the
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Greater liberality is shown also in the provision for delegation
of directors' power to executive committees, which it is provided,
commonly, the board may designate and vest with their full au-
thority. Such a provision appears in Idaho, Indiana, Michigan
and Minnesota.92 Greater freedom for action is allowed also in
the provisions such as those of Michigan and Minnesota authoriz-
ing the substitution of several or collective written consent for
board meetings.03 On the other hand, a somewhat larger control
of directors' action is provided by the more specific regulations
as to removal. There is, however, no general uniformity in these
provisions. In some of the states, as in Minnesota, the directors
may be removed with or without cause by a majority vote.94 In
Michigan such removal is limited to situations where cause ex-
ists. 15 In Idaho, a two-thirds vote is required, as is the case in
Louisiana.96 In the latter state, the board of directors is per-
mitted a limited power of removal for cause.9 7 It is generally
provided that vacancies may be filled by the remaining directors.
III.
It has been stated above that the principal failure of the mod-
ern statutes has been to devise controls adequate for the new
powers which they create. Heretofore the individual sharehold-
er's principal protections have been his voting rights, his pre-
6mptive right, his power to institute a representative suit and
his rights to information. All of these have been greatly limited
in the modern statutes either through direct statutory restric-
tions or through statutory authorization of provisions in the
articles which eliminate or restrict them.
First in relation to voting rights. While all of the statutes
make provision for voting, practically all make it possible for
articles provide the contrary: Idaho Code 1932 § 29-138(1); Ill. B. C. A.
§ 33; Laws of La. 1928, no. 250, § 34 I; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327,
§ 13-1; Laws of Minn. 1933, c. 300, § 27 I; Pa. B. C. L. § 401.
92. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-138(2), (3); Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-208;
Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 13(4), (e); Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300,
§ 27(IV), (h). Also in Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania: Ill.
B. C. A. § 38; Laws of La. 1928, no. 250, § 34 111(e); Ohio Gen. Code,
§ 8623-60; Pa. B. C. L. § 402.
93. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 13(4), (d); Laws of Minn. 1933,
ch. 300, § 27(IV), (g).
94. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 28(1).
95. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 13 (3).
96. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-138(4); La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1114(111), (b).
97. La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1114(111), (a).
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the voting power to be concentrated in a very small segment of
the outstanding share structure.971 The exception in Illinois is
due to a provision in the state constitution which seems to require
at least a limited voting power in all shares. 91 Even the privilege
of accumulating the voting power of the minority seems to be
on its way out. In same states this is protected by constitutional
-provisions, but in Minnesota, Michigan, Louisiana and Indiana
it may be eliminated by appropriate drafting of the articles. 0
On the other hand California and Idaho protect the right.1 00
None of the statutes discriminates between large and small
companies in respect to voting provisions. The idea of voting
-undoubtedly had its origin in democratic conceptions, particu-
larly appropriate to the non-profit and non-stock corporations,
and perhaps not greatly less so in the characteristically small
corporations of the first half of the nineteenth century. There
is, of course, a vast amount of business which is done today by
small corporations operating locally. As to these the voting
mechanism may well remain a very valuable incident. The rea-
sons are not apparent, except in cases of the one man company
97a. This statement must be qualified by the fact that many of the new
statutes introduce a limited and absolute right to vote, even in stock which
is non-voting under the articles; principally by classes when class interests
are involved in a manner peculiar to some classes and not to others (Calif.
Civ. Code § 362a, as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 61; Idaho Code 1932,
v§ 29-145; Ill. B. C. A. § 53; Ind. B. C. A. § 25(a), (b) ; Laws of La. 1928,
no. 250, § 42 III; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 44, as amended by Pub.
Acts 1935, no. 194; Minn. B. C. A. § 36, 111(c), as amended by L. 1935,
•c. 117, § 7); and also, more rarely, by all of the outstanding stock, voting
and non-voting, upon matters of major importance, such as amendments
changing the corporate purposes substantially (Laws of La. 1928, no. 250
§ 42 IV; Minn. B. C. A. § 36, as amended by L. 1935, c. 117, § 8 111 (d)) ;
assessment upon fully paid shares (Calif. Civ. Code § 362a, as amended
by L. 1933, c. 533, § 61) ; merger and consolidation (Calif. Civ. Code, supra,
§ 59(3); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 52); sale of all corporate prop-
-erty (Pa. B. C. L. § 311). This reservation of a limited voting power upon
matters of paramount importance regardless of contrary provisions in the
articles, represents one of the few "conservative" tendencies of the recent
statutes. Its effectiveness as a protection for the small shareholder, particu-
larly, in the large company is qualified, however, by his relatively complete
inability to secure adequately detailed information as a basis for guidance
in casting his ballot.
98. Ill. Const. 1870, art. XI, § 3; Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 32,§ 157.28.
99. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 25 (III); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no.
327, § 32; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1112(11) ; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1922, § 25-207.
100. Deering's Civil Code Calif. 1931, § 320; Idaho Code 1932, § 29-
133(2).
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and the closed corporation which is really a partnership in cor-
porate form, for extending to the great body of these local com-
panies the vast amount of freedom which the statutes permit in
eliminating the voting power. On the other hand the idea that
fifty thousand investors can express an intelligent opinion about
the conduct of corporate affairs in a changing business world
characterized by rapidly fluctuating price structure is an absurd-
ity except for the rarest instances of emergency action. Even
in these circumstances when the shares of the large corporation
are fairly widely scattered, resort to any considerable percentage
of the shareholders for advice or decision is of the most doubtful
value. Realization of this fact, as well as the desire of financial
manipulators to free themselves from restrictions, undoubtedly
lies behind the gradual abrogation of voting power in the large
concerns. One reasonably can doubt that the preservation of
voting power in the large companies would constitute anything
more than a nominal protection to the shareholder. The provision
of contingent voting power in classes of securities normally de-
prived of them may be valid for use in emergency situations. But
one hardly could weep over the disappearance of the widespread
and farcial device of proxy voting in the larger corporations.
However, the recent statutes quite generally put the stamp of
approval upon the proxy system, although most of them have
provisions to check the operation of stale proxies. 1' 1 In line with
this tendency also is the uniform approval of the voting trust,1°0
though this also is hedged about by restrictions here and there
concerning the duration of the trust 3 and the occasional provi-
sion giving other shareholders the right to enter the trust ar-
rangement on the same terms as those extended to the share-
holders originally participating."," Minnesota has a provision
permitting termination of the trust at any time by a majority
101. See, for example, Idaho Code 1932, § 29-133 (3); Burns' Ind. Stat.
1933, § 25-207(e); La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1112 (III).
102. See Civil Code Calif., § 321a; Idaho Code 1933, § 29-134; La. Gen.
Stat. 1932, § 1113; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 34, as amended by
Extra Session L. 1934, Act No. 34; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 26;
Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-34; Pa. Bus. Corp. L. 1933 (P. L. no. 106) § 511;
Rem. Rev. Stat. Wash. 1932 § 3803-29. The Indiana provision seems to
approve the device. There is no statutory provision in Illinois.
103. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-134; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1113; Laws of
Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 26.
104. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-134(3) ; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1113 (III).
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vote, unless otherwise specified,105 and in California this may be
done if the sole purpose of the trust is voting.100
Were it not for the necessity of finding some means for the
selection of management, the writer would be almost ready to
suggest the total elimination of the voting scheme in the large
company, and the provision of some other check upon unsatis-
factory conduct of officers and directors. If, however, such a
check or checks can be devised, there will be even less reason to
bemoan with Professor Ripley the present and the apparently
increasing concentration of voting power in the hands of man-
agement.0 7
In a corporation with a simple stock structure, especially if all
the shares have voting power, the preemptive right is a very val-
uable protection to the shareholder. However, as Professors Frey
and Ballantine, among others, have pointed out,0 8 the predmp-
tive right becomes only a source of "insoluble difficulties" in the
large company with an intricate share structure. For this rea-
son the courts have labored heavily to devise exceptions to and
modifications of the right.0 9 In this some were, of course, more
successful than others. Nevertheless, the situation became pre-
eminently one for legislation. Following the signs indicated by
the courts, the legislatures have moved along the way toward the
ultimate disappearance of the predmptive right. Most of the stat-
utes permit the articles to make any provision desired concern-
ing it."" Normally, this is followed with the statement that in
the absence of a contrary charter provision, the shareholder shall
have no predmptive right in certain specified types of security is-
sues, including issues of treasury shares, issues to employees,
105. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 26 (I).
106. Deering's Civil Code 1931, § 297.
107. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (1927).
108. Frey, Shareholders' Preemptive Rights (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 563;
Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law
(1931) 19 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 469; Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the
Illinoisf Business Corporation Act (1934) 1 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 357, 362.
109. See the cases cited in Ballantine, Private Corporations (1927) p.
421, n. 34, p. 422, n. 36, p. 423, n. 38a, and in general Frey, op. cit. supra,
n. 108.
110. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 297; Idaho Code 1932, § 29-
119 (6) ; Ill. Bus. Corp. Act (L. 1933 p. 310) § 47 (k) ; Ind. Gen. Corp. Act
§ 6(i) ; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1108(I) ; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 31;
Laws of Minn. 1933, c. 300, § 3 (i) ; Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-4 (b) ; Pa. Bus.
Corp. Act 1933 (P. L. no. 106), § 204(11).
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etc.' In California, the preemptive right is abrogated unless spe-
cific contrary provision is made in the articles.112 In Louisiana, in
the absence of such contrary provision, holders of voting shares
are given preemptive rights in voting shares allotted for cash."'
Thus another of the shareholder's protections is on its way out.
Probably this is justifiable as to the large corporation which finds
it necessary in raising capital to make its share structure a com-
plicated one; but again it seems that the freedom of contract
allowed by the new statutes is greater than is necessary or desir-
able in relatively small and local companies.
In the legislative period which covers the history of our great-
est corporate expansion perhaps the most sacred right of the
shareholder was his right to information. While the voting
rights and preemptive rights were being whittled down by the
courts, through their approval of concentrative devices, the legis-
latures were extending and the courts were enforcing the share-
holders' right to information. The limitatiQns of the common
law rule were found generally too restrictive, and we witnessed
the growth of the so-called absolute right of the shareholder to
examine the books of account and the records of the company. 1 4
These were accompanied by punitive provisions levied now
against the company, now against its officials, in case of refusal
or neglect to comply with the shareholder's demand, however
unreasonable. 115 The result, of course, was a very considerable
amount of blackmail, and of unfair competition by shareholder-
competitors. This has led to a general return in the modern acts
to the common law rule, limiting the right of examination to
reasonable times and proper purposes. 16
However necessary this may have been, a tendency is appar-
ent in some of the statutes to go further than is necessary to
111. See for example, Idaho Code 1932, § 29-119(6); Mich. Pub. Acts
1931, no. 327, § 31.
112. Deering's Civil Code 1937, § 297.
113. La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1108(11).
114. See for example, Henry v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 196 N. Y. 302,
89 N. E. 942 (1909) ; Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 246 I1. 170, 92 N. E.
643 (1910); Furst v. Rawleigh Medical Co., 282 Ill. 366, 118 N. E. 763
(1918); Weihenmayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325, 42 Atl. 245 (1898), quoted and
approved in State v. Bucklin, 83 Wash. 23, 145 Pac. 58 (1914) ; Cincinnati
Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 56 N. E. 1033 (1900).
115. See for example, R. S. Mo. 1929, § 4551.
116. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 355; Idaho Code 1932, § 29-
143; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-210; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 33.
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protect the corporation from the abuses of the old absolute right.
For instance, in Michigan and Louisiana, the shareholder who is
entitled to an examination must hold two per cent of all the out-
standing stock"17 (or, in Michigan, of any class)-, for a specified
period prior to the date of his demand. In Louisiana, if the
shareholder is a business competitor, he must hold twenty-five
per cent of the outstanding stock.1 9 In Idaho, a shareholder with
less than ten per cent of the total capital stock is not permitted
to take a list of the names and addresses of shareholders except
by special permission of the directors.2 0
Such provisions as these would effectually bar all shareholders
in many of our largest corporations, among which abuses of
management have been in certain instances most noticeable in
recent history.12 In a period in which the other protections of
the individual shareholder are gradually disappearing, it seems
that the new statutes should not go farther than is necessary in
restricting the shareholder's right to information in order to
avoid possible abuses which generally can be controlled in other
ways.
The harmful effect of these excessive limitations is offset to
some extent by the more modern requirements for the making
of annual reports to the shareholders and in some instances to
the state ;122 and for entitling the shareholders to demand a cer-
tified financial statement and profit and loss statement for the
117. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 45; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1118.
118. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 45.
119. La. L. 1928, Act No. 250, § 38, as amended by Fourth Extra Ses-
sion, L. 1935, Act No. 34. The provision extends not only to business com-
petitors, but also to "a person who is interested in a corporation who(which) is a business competitor, or one who holds stock in said com-
petitive business."
120. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-143.
121. Perhaps the situation reflected in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York et al., 288 U. S. 123, 53 S. Ct. 295, 77 L. ed. 652 (1933), is not a
typical one, but there is evidence that it is all too common to justify prac-
tical abolition of the shareholder's right to information and means of inves-
tigation. The difficulties placed in his way by the court in that decision,
and even more controlling ones of general application arising from the
mere factor of expense render this right tenuous enough at best for the
bona fide shareholder. His narrow protection afforded by the right of
examination should not be entirely abolished in the attempt to check oper-
ations of the so-called blackmailer-shareholder.
122. Civil Code of Calif. § 358 as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 57; Idaho
Code 1932, § 29-601; Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 32, § 157.95-6; Burns'
Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-244; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1119.
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current or preceding fiscal period.123 Many of these, however,
are woefully inadequate in specifying the detail with which the
statement shall be made, and nearly all, with California as a
notable exception,1 4 fail to require any information concerning
subsidiary companies. Nearly all of the statutes make provision
for penalties, in some cases excessive in character,125 in others
hardly sufficient to be effective,126 to be imposed either upon the
corporation or upon the officials involved for failure to file the
reports specified, or to supply the statements prescribed.
Despite these attempts to secure an adequate substitute for
the old absolute right of examination, it is probably true, as Pro-
fessor Dodd says, that "the only really effective effort to obtain
the publication of information sufficiently detailed and compre-
hensive to be of real value to investors is that made by recent
federal statutes."'12 7
The one old protection of the shareholder which, on the sur-
face, does not seem to have been greatly attenuated by the mod-
ern acts, is his power to institute a representative suit. Even
this has been curtailed, perhaps in some cases almost to the point
of extinction, by the unnecessarily restrictive provisions concern-
ing examination of the books and records referred to above. It
is safe to conclude that this right has not been extended on the
whole, but rather has been restricted, as a general result of the
recent enactments.
IV.
Space does not permit a detailed treatment of the provisions
of the recent acts relating to capitalization. 12  Nearly all of the
123. Civil Code of Calif. § 359, as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 58;
Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 45; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 34.
124. Deering's Civil Code 1931, § 358.
125. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 91 (forfeiture of charter for failure
to file annual report for two successive years); Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933,
§ 25-250 (as in Michigan).
126. Deering's Civil Code Calif. 1931, § 368, as amended by L. 1933, c.
533, § 68, providing a penalty of $100 plus $10 per day to a maximum of$1,000 imposed upon the corporation for failure to keep the specified books
and records or to prepare or submit the required financial statement. See
also Civ. Code § 358, as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 57 and § 359,
as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 58. In a situation like that presented in
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, supra n. 121, a maximum fine
of $1,000 to be paid by the corporation would be a small price for the
management to pay for the privilege of debarring the inquisitive share-
holder from the information necessary for his further action.
127. Op. cit. supra, note 7, p. 49.
128. See, however, Ballantine, Corporate Capital and Restrictions upon
Dividends under Modern Corporation Laws (1935) 23 Calif. L. Rev. 229;
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statutes have abandoned maximum limitations, but, as in Michi-
gan, Minnesota and Indiana, specify minimum amounts with
which business may be begun. 129 All permit the issuance of no-
par stock, and all make some attempt to solve the problems of
capitalization raised by the introduction of this device. The
emergence of the concept of stated capital as an attempt at solu-
tion of this problem is a general characteristic, although there
is great variety in the detail of particular definitions. 180 Perhaps,
the most workmanlike job is that in California1 3' which is fol-
lowed somewhat closely in Minnesota. 1 32 Accompanying the at-
tempts at definition of stated capital are numerous and diverse
provisions concerning the definition of the various types of sur-
plus. Paid-in surplus is being recognized generally 33 and re-
quirements are made for keeping it distinct from earned surplus
and surpluses created by capital reduction and by appreciation
or revaluation.134 Many of the statutes, however, are not suffi-
ciently restrictive in differentiating the various types of surplus
according to their source.135 While these attempts undoubtedly
constitute advances, in view of the general acceptance of the no-
par device, all of them have underlying weaknesses in the provi-
Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act
(1934) 1 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 357, 358-362, 364-379; Hills, Model Cor-
poration Act (1935) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1334.
129. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, No. 327, § 4(1) ($1,000); Laws of Minn.
1933, ch. 300, § 3(f) ($1,000); Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-216(8) ($500).
Also La. Gen. Stat. 1933, § 1088 ($1,000); Sess. L. of Wash. 1933, ch. 185,
§ 7 ($500).
130. See Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 300b, as amended by L.
1933, c. 533, § 9; Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. of Ill. 1935, ch. 32, § 157.2(k);
Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 1 (X), § 61 as amended by L. 1935, c. 117,
§§ 10, 11; Throckmorton's Code of Ohio 1930, § 8623-37; Laws of Pa. 1933,
no. 106, Art. I. (Bus. Corp. L. § 614). Recent acts which retain the older
term "capital stock" are: Idaho Code 1932, § 29-101(10); Burns' Ind. Stat.
1933, § 25-101; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1080X; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327,
§ 82, as amended by P. A. 1935, no. 194, and § 20, as amended by P. A.
1935, no. 194; Laws of Wash. 1933, ch. 185, § 1, X.
131. Deering's Civil Code 1931, § 330b.
132. Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 1, X, § 61 as amended by L. 1935,
c. 117, §§ 10, 11.
133. Deering's Civil Code Calif. 1931, § 300(b) ; Idaho Code 1932, § 29-
128; Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. Ill. 1935, ch. 32, § 157.2(1); La. Gen. Stat.
1932, § 1105; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 20; Throckmorton's Code of
Ohio 1930, § 8623-23; Laws of Wash. 1933, ch. 185, § 23.
134. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 346; Idaho Code 1932, § 29-
129(2); Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 20; Laws of Wash. 1933, chap. 185,§ 24.
135. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-148; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933 (no provision);
Laws of La. 1928, No. 250, §§ 25, 45; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 20.
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sions for valuation of property, services, and other types of con-
sideration authorized to be accepted for shares at the time of
original issue.136 While these limitations are designed primarily
as controls of distributions, whether by way of dividends or of
retirement of outstanding shares, the broad discretion generally
permitted in the initial valuation of assets makes their ultimate
effect of extremely doubtful value.1 37
Assuming that reasonable valuations have been made, and that
honest and relatively accurate books have been kept, the provi-
sions as to stated capital and the various types of surplus un-
doubtedly constitute more specific directions concerning distri-
butions than formerly existed. In general, dividends of cash or
property are prohibited to be paid from unrealized asset appre-
ciation"s (with occasional exceptions as to securities having a
readily ascertainable market value)13 and from revaluation of
assets.1 4 0 Some of the statutes authorize dividends out of paid-in
surplus,'4 ' but guard this by requiring notice of the source to be
given to the shareholder 2 and, in some instances, included in
the annual public report 143 and in other instances by limiting such
dividends to outstanding shares having either preferential divi-
136. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 300a as amended by L. 1933,
c. 533, § 8; Laws of Ill. 1933, p. 310, § 17; Ind. Gen. Corp. Act 1929, § 6 (c) ;
La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1097; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 21; Laws of
Minn. 1933, § 14; Ohio Gen. Code, § 862S-16; Rem. Rev. Stat. Wash. 1932,
§ 3803-17. The usual provision is that the judgment of the directors is
conclusive in the absence of fraud or bad faith. Michigan requires them to
exercise "reasonable care" and Minnesota requires a "reasonable investiga-
tion." In Indiana and Ohio par shares may be issued for cash at less than
par in certain conditions. In Louisiana, Washington and Pennsylvania, in
some cases, the valuation is made by the shareholders or the incorporators.
See, for the latter state, Pa. Bus. Corp. Law, § 603(A).
137. See text at infra, note 152.
138. Civil Code of Calif., § 346, as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 49;
Idaho Code 1932, § 29-129(4) ; Ill. Bus. Corp. Act (L. 1933, p. 310) § 41(c) ;
Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-211; La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1106(I) (b) (2);
Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 22; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 21(I).
139. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-129(5) (c); La. Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1106-
(I) (b) (4) ; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 21(I).
140. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-129(4); Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-211; La.
Gen. Stat. 1932, § 1106(I) (b) (2).
141. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 346(3); La. Gen. Stat. 1932,
§ 1106(11); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 22; Laws of Minn. 1933,
§ 21(11) (b).
142. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 346a(2); La. Gen. Stat. 1932,
§ 1106(11); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 22; Laws of Minn. 1933, ch.
300, § 21(11) (b) ; Throcknorton's Code of Ohio 1930, § 8623-38 (d).
143. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, No. 327, § 22.
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dend rights or liquidation values. 44 In some of the states, divi-
dends may be paid only out of some form of surplus,", but in
others, as in California, Minnesota and Delaware they may be
paid from annual net profits even though capital is impaired prior
to the payment.14 Usually there are provisions against the pay-
ment of dividends which will have the effect of impairing capital,
but these ordinarily are so vague as to constitute only general
guides1 4
With reference to the purchase and redemption of the corpo-
ration's own shares, the more recent statutes vary considerably
in detail. The excellent policy of the California14 and Illinois' 49
statutes is directed, as Professor Ballantine states, "to discourage
speculation by the corporation in its own shares, by restricting
purchases in general to earned surpluses." 0 Certain exceptions,
however, even in these statutes offer considerable opportunity
for purchases detrimental to creditors and other shareholders,
such as those permitting redemption of preferred shares, pur-
chase of the shares of dissenting shareholders in specified in-
stances, and repurchase of shares issued under employees' share
participation plans, or purchase for sale to employees, especially,
when the latter do not exclude directors and officers. Attempts
are made also to control reduction of stated capital in the inter-
est of creditors and other shareholders.15
In general one cannot view these attempts with great satis-
faction. When one has struggled with these problems as long
144. Civil Code of Calif., § 346, as amended by L. 1933, c. 533, § 49 (3) ;
Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 21(11) (b) ; Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-38; Pa.
L. 1933, no. 106, § 701, as amended by L. 1935, Act No. 361; Rem. Rev.
Stat. Wash. 1932, § 3803-24.
145. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-129; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 29-211; Ill.
Bus. Corp. Act (L. 1933, p. 310) § 41.
146. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 346 (2), as amended by L. 1933,
c. 533, § 49(2); Laws of Minn. 1933, ch. 300, § 21(11) (c); Rev. Code of
Del. 1915, § 1949. The Michigan act also authorizes dividends "either from
earned surplus or net earnings." Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 22, as amended
by P. A. 1935, no. 194. See also the carefully drawn Minnesota provision:
L. 1933, c. 300, § 21, (II) (c).
147. Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-211; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 10(h).
148. Deering's Civil Code 1931, § 347.
149. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 32, § 157.58.
150. A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act (1934)
1 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 357, 365.
151. See Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 348; Smith-Hurd Rev.
Stat. (Ill.) 1935, ch. 32, § 157.59; Throckmorton's Code of Ohio 1930,
§ 8623-39.
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and as faithfully as has Professor Ballantine, it is at least dis-
heartening to find the result of his labors heading up in consider-
ation of the possibilities of finding substitutes for the present
system. He states:
"No satisfactory substitutes for surplus and profits as
tests of statutory limits on permissible dividend distribu-
tion have as yet been devised. It might be possible to discard
the present stated capital and surplus system entirely, and
replace it with a provision that withdrawals must not be
made unless after each such withdrawal the fair present
value of the assets would be at least equal to, say, one and
one-fourth times the debts and liabilities of the corporation.
This would prescribe a minimum margin of safety of twen-
ty-five percent over the debts and liabilities. Another possi-
bility would be to require a certain current ratio, that is, a
fixed minimum ratio of current assets to current liabilities
as indicating a liquid position."'152
V.
In general summary it may be said that the new incorpora-
tion laws follow the lead of Delaware in abrogating the old stat-
utory limitations upon corporate organization and substitute
therefore large authorizations for incorporated institutions to
create their own types of security structure, powers, and limita-
tions. In general, they are designed to give the maximum free-
dom to the incorporators, and to adjust the statutory provisions
to the requirements of the large scale mass production enterprise.
The statutes have been successful, perhaps beyond the dream of
the initiators of the present large-scale system, in the creation of
motive power. They have created a system which not only is
adapted to cope with the rapidly changing conditions of the busi-
ness environment, but also, and in consequence thereof, is liable
to great abuses. The individual shareholder now has largely a
"pig-in-a-poke." His old vested rights are gone or are going.
He is made more dependent with each new statute upon the de-
sires of the management and the majority which often is only
another name for the management. Nevertheless, the power de-
velopment probably has been a necessary one. Certainly it has
been so and will continue to be so if the trend of business organ-
152. Ballantine and Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Divi-
dends Under Modern Corporation Laws (1935) 23 Calif. L. Rev. 229, 1. c.
262.
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ization continues in the direction of the large unit. The failure,
and it has been a real one, has been in the refusal or inability
to devise new types of control, adequate to act as brakes upon
the new motive power without destroying its effectiveness. It is
believed however that not all the possibilities have been ex-
hausted. One or two will be suggested.
In the first place, it is doubtful, to say the least, whether it
has been necessary to extend all of the powers and privileges of
the new acts to all corporations. To a philosopher, it would ap-
pear incongruous to provide the same mechanism for legal organ.
ization of "The Corner Peanut Wagon, Incorporated," and "The
United States Steel Corporation." It also borders upon the silly
to refuse incorporation to John Doe and yet permit him to
achieve the corporate status by using dummies. Even more ab-
surd is the requirement that he and his dummies solemnly re-
solve themselves into meetings as directors and shareholders in
order to carry on his corporate business.153 So far, in the fram-
ing of our general incorporation laws, the state legislatures have
refused to recognize that John Doe, Incorporated, The Acme
Grocery Corporation, and the Steel Corporation, are essentially
different institutions. If it is believed necessary to confer vast
powers on gigantic corporations in order to induce them to stay
at home, it does not follow that the same powers or the same
153. As implied in Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, No. 327, §§ 3 and 13. It is
entirely possible, of course, that the situation presented in Jackson v.
Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592, 75 At. 368 (1909), will be extended to the one-
man corporation. That case involved a true "incorporated partnership,"
but out of respect for the corporate rigmarole designed to fit a group
situation, the court refused to recognize the contract for equal control made
by the shareholders substantially interested in the enterprise. A result in
the contrary direction was reached in Holsinger v. Herring, 207 Ia. 1218,
224 N. W. 766 (1929). The effect of the decision in the Hooper case was to
give the final voice in control of the company to a "dummy" shareholder
having no substantial interest in the enterprise. While such a result might
be justified in the situation there presented as providing a method of break-
ing the deadlock between the two real owners, not even this justification
exists in the case of the "one-man company." In that situation when the
statute requires three directors, as does the Michigan Act, the effect ofjudicial adherence to the normal statutory scheme of action is to give ulti-
mate control to the two "dummies," in effect giving two men the power to
run another business. If it is thought desirable to encourage or permit
one-man incorporation, the further step should be taken of authorizing
one-man control, so long as no one else is interested in the corporation. The
fact that the "real owner" normally has economic or other controls over the
"dummy" does not require that the latter should be given such vast oppor-
tunity for blackmail or other form of injury to the former.
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restrictions should be given to or imposed upon John Doe and
the Acme Grocery Corporation. With reference to John Doe, it
would seem high time for the states to recognize, as Michigan
and Iowa have done,15' that he has to compete in an incorporated
world, and if he cannot do so honestly and openly, he will do so
by subterfuge. In many cases this injures no one, but in others
it offers opportunity for all kinds of legal tight-rope walking.
Why should not the states then recognize the call of John Doe
as they have that of the Steel Company, and provide for him a
simple corporate mechanism adapted to his circumstances and
needs? This should involve not only direct and simple authority
for a single individual to incorporate, but also provision for di-
rect control of the incorporated enterprise by the individual
whose business is incorporated. Every laborer knows that John
Doe is "boss" of John Doe, Incorporated. The law should not
be blind to such an elementary "fact of life" in the corporate
world. Nor should it create the opportunity, which occasionally
is seized, for a mere "dummy" to decide the future of another
man's business in a manner contrary to that man's interests and
desires.
As to the Acme Grocery Company again it seems unnecessary
to supply this small local concern, capitalized, say, at not more
than $100,000.00, and having from twenty to a hundred share-
holders, resident in the general locality of the corporation's busi-
ness, with all of the high-powered devices which are given to the
Steel Company. While these small concerns are permitted, by
the general freedom of contract which characterizes the latest
statutes, to simplify their organization as much as they desire,
they are also given the power to change this simple structure
over the protest of a considerable minority and without the same
necessity for doing so which characterizes the Steel Company.
Furthermore, valuable protections formerly surrounding the in-
dividual shareholder and the minority, are abrogated.
It would seem that an intelligent approach to the general prob-
lem of incorporation would require at least three types of gen-
eral incorporation laws in each state: One for the single incor-
porator, another for the small concern, and a third for the exten-
sive business setup, for purposes of mass production.
154. Supra, notes 30 and 31.
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Normally, it is not the small concern which incorporates away
from home. And if it were, the matter could be controlled by
sufficiently stringent provisions as to the entrance of foreign cor-
porations of this type. By so differentiating the different types
of business institutions in accordance with the realities of their
business situation and requirements, many of the old safeguards
could be retained, at least partially, without unduly hampering
the creation of a modern type of corporate motive power where
needed.
As to the large concern the problem would remain of devising
new controls. It is the writer's view that all attempts along the
lines now being followed by the new state incorporation laws to
achieve adequate protections either for creditors or investing
shareholders will fail. One alternative, of course, would be the
institution of rather rigid administrative controls either through
the establishment of state corporation commissions with real
visitatorial powers, or the creation of similar controls under the
auspices of the Federal Government. The writer does not expect
such an attempt by the states. It is possible that the Federal
Government will go further than it has done recently in corpo-
rate legislation. The proposal of a national incorporation act is
intriguing 55 but has its difficulties. 15 The subject is too large
for treatment at this point, although it is the writer's view that
the proposal has very real possibilities, and probably will turn
out to be the ultimate resort of an impatient, if not angry, public.
155. At one time or another the proposal has caught the fancy of Presi-
dents Theodore Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson, former Secretary of Commerce
and Labor Charles Nagel, former Solicitor-General Frederick W. Lehman,
Senator William E. Borah and other statesmen of national distinction dis-
gusted with the situation in which "the state with lowest standards forces
the hand of all the rest." As late as 1934 Frank Altschul, Chairman on
Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange, wrote to the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency urging full exploration of the possibili-
ties of Federal incorporation despite the "enormous political difficulties in
the way of such legislation." This action was urged as a possible means
of checking state "practices which have often given us concern" and as a
possible means of providing some real protection for investors. The bill
introduced by Senator O'Mahoney in 1935 and his subsequent advocacy of
its adoption have aided in reviving discussion of the proposal. Had the
World War not interrupted the progressive program of legislation in the
Wilson Administration, it is possible that such a statute would have been
enacted. Had this been the case, there is little room for doubt that it
would have been effective to check materially, if not to prevent, the post-
war deluge of holding companies.
156. See Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation (193.6)
49 Harv. L. Rev. 396.
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Can any less difficult and perhaps less objectionable controls
be devised? In one or two respects the recent statutes have sug-
gestive provisions. One is the so-called "appraisal" statute, by
which a dissenting shareholder is permitted to demand payment
of the fair cash value of his shares, in case of certain unusual
actions such as merger and consolidation, amendment substan-
tially affecting his rights, and sale of the enterprise or its entire
assets. 57 This is not primarily a control, but an escape; it offers
the dissatisfied investor a way out. To a limited extent the possi-
bility of resort to it by a considerable number of shareholders
will operate to prevent action. It is, however, a relatively new
device. When the results of its use are better known, perhaps it
can be extended to more frequent uses, thus offsetting to some
extent the abrogation of the shareholder's former contractual
position.
Another provision which characterizes the California act"58
and some others',1 is the requirement that on certain unusual
questions every share or every share affected shall be entitled to
participate in a class vote, regardless of the general provisions
of the articles as to voting rights. This operates to introduce a
statutory right of veto in the class but not in the individual. It
has the merit of a real check, but of course in the large company
where shares are widely distributed even within the class, this
procedure can be resorted to effectively only in emergency situa-
tions. While the provision undoubtedly is a valuable one, and
especially so because it is better designed to fit the modern motive
power without unduly checking it than were the old voting pro-
visions, it offers the suggestion of a possible extension which
might create a real brake correlative to the modern motor power.
If a class can express a class view upon particular matters of
policy, there seems to be no reason why it could not be permitted
to set up an agency representative of its interests to stand on
157. Deering's Civil Code of Calif. 1931, § 369; Rev. Code Del. 1915,
§ 1975; Idaho Code 1932, §§ 29-149, 29-155; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, §§ 25-236,
25-240; Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (Ill.) 1935, §§ 157.70, 157.73; La. Gen. Stat.
1932, § 1132; Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, §§ 44, 54; Laws of Minn. 1933,
ch. 300, §§ 39, 43.
158. Deering's Civil Code 1931, §§ 361(3), 362a.
159. Idaho Code 1932, § 29-145(4); Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (I1.) 1935,
ch. 32, § 157.54; Burns' Ind. Stat. 1933, § 25-224(b); La. Gen. Stat. 1932,
§ 1122(111); Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, no. 327, § 43; Sess. L. Minn. 1933, ch.
300, § 36 111 (d).
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guard concerning them, and in certain instances to take action
to protect them. What is proposed is in substance a "board of
directors" or observers for each class of shares. The general
managerial power, of course, would continue to be vested in the
presently constituted board of directors. The class boards would
not be given power to initiate policies, or generally to represent
the corporation. They could, however, keep track of the general
trend of corporate affairs. They could be given broad powers of
inspection of the corporate books and records. They could be in-
vested with the power to institute a suit on behalf of the class,
somewhat similar to the present shareholder's suit. A limited
power of assessment or a lien on shares of the class to cover
expenses of examination, investigation and litigation could be
provided. Certain veto powers now conferred upon the class
could be conferred upon and exercised by them, at least in the
first instance. What the American corporation has lacked always,
and what the state incorporation laws have never provided, is
an effective critical agency within the corporation itself. The
provision for cumulative voting was a step in this direction, but
not a long, nor, as it now appears, a permanent one. It would
be necessary, of course, to make statutory provisions designed to
secure the independence of the class directors from the general
directors. It should not be difficult to do this, at least in the
company with widely scattered shares.
Such a proposal, of course, will not be looked upon with favor
by that portion of the managerial interest in big business, which
has sought and seeks almost complete freedom from public and
shareholder control. Perhaps the idea is chimerical, but it may
contain the possibility of establishing an effective check in behalf
of minorities and even of majorities presently almost helpless.
It might have the additional merit, from the viewpoint of the
advocate of private enterprise, of staving off, if not of ultimately
preventing, a very widespread expansion of public administra-
tive control in the interests of the investing, the laboring, and
perhaps the consuming public.16
0
160. Since the manuscript of this article was completed, the writer has
discovered that the suggestion for a "class board" is not entirely novel. In
1925 the following suggestion was made: "It is therefore suggested that
machinery be created whereby representatives can be elected by the differ-
ent groups of security holders who will advise the security holders, from
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/4
19371 INCORPORATION STATUTES 343
time to time, as to the condition of the corporation, by way of check upon
the management. In all corporations of more than a minimum number of
security holders, such advisory committees could be elected annually by the
respective groups of security holders." Eustace Seligman, Broader Legal
Aspects of Customer Stock Ownership (1925) 50 Reports of Amer. Bar
Assoc. 851, 853-4, quoted Ballantine, Private Corporations (1927) 546 n.
151. The provisions of general vigilance committees under the Mexican
Commercial Code and the British Companies Acts (see Ballantine, op. cit.
supra, p. 546, n. 151 and p. 555, n. 180) offer legislative sanction for the
proposal. In the writer's view the provision for class, rather than general
committees, would offer the greater protection, and there seems no valid
reason for limiting their functions merely to that of securing and divulging
information.
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